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1 Introduction
That a household comprising several adult members with specic preferences
does not necessarily behave as a single rational agent should not be an object
of debate. We know, at least since Arrows famous impossibility theorem, that
groups do not usually behave as individuals. Yet, for decades most theoret-
ical and applied micro-economic work on household consumption, labor sup-
ply, savings or fertility behavior has been based on the assumption that indeed
household decisions could be analyzed as stemming from a unique, well behaved
utility function; this sometimes known as the unitary assumption.
The natural explanation for such a practice in the demand literature is that
only household expenditures are usually observed. In general, there is prac-
tically no information on the way these expenditures are allocated among the
various members of the household - possibly for public use - nor on the way that
allocation may depend on aggregate savings or fertility decisions. The house-
hold thus appears as a black box which is conveniently modeled using the single
rational agent hypothesis. It is quite revealing that the rst attempts away from
that practice were made on one hand in relation with the few cases where it was
possible to observe the allocation of some good within the household or some
consequences of that allocation, and on the other hand when endogenizing the
formation (marriage) or the breakdown of households. The rst bargaining
models of household behavior have thus developed in connection with models
of joint labor supply within the household as well as divorce theory; see Manser
and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981) and Becker (1991). Likewise,
some literature has built up on the issue of food allocation within families in de-
veloping countries based on the observation that in some countries boys seem to
be better nourished than girls; see Behrman (2000) for a review of this literature.
It remains that the unitary approach is questionable from a theoretical per-
spective. An additional problem is that it seems to be contradicted by the data.
Perhaps the most convincing falsication has been provided by the literature
on distribution factors. Distribution factors are dened as variables that can
inuence household behavior, if at all, only through their impact on the decision
process; that is, they a¤ect neither preferences nor the budget constraint, and
should thus be irrelevant in a unitary context. A rst wave of models, starting
with Thomas (1990), Schultz (1990), Bourguignon et al (1993) and Browning et
al (1994), test the income poolinghypothesis, according to which, controlling
for total household income, its distribution between members should not a¤ect
behavior. All these papers reject the income pooling assumption.
A common concern raised by these models is that labor as well as non la-
bor income may be endogenous, which could bias the results. For that reason,
recent contributions have explored the impact of other, arguably more exoge-
nous distribution factors. Thomas et al. (1997), using an Indonesian survey,
have shown that the distribution of wealth by gender at marriage has a sig-
nicant impact on children health in those areas where wealth remains under
the contributors control, even when current wealth and income were controlled
2
for.1 Duo (1999) has derived similar conclusions from a careful analysis of a
reform of the South African social pension program that extended the benets
to a large, previously not covered black population; she shows that the impact
of this windfall gain on the health of children crucially depends on the gender
of the recipient - a typical distribution factor2 . Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix
(2002) use the state of the marriage market, as proxied by the sex ratio by age,
race and state, and the legislation on divorce as particular distribution factors
to study household labor supply; they nd that an environment more favorable
to women is associated with a signicantly lower (resp. higher) level of female
(resp. male) labor supply. In a similar context, Rubalcava and Thomas (2000)
refer to the generosity of single parent benets and reach identical conclusions.
Recognizing that households might not behave according to the single ra-
tional agent model does not mean that there cannot be any restriction on their
aggregate consumption or joint labor supply behavior. Rationality may still be
present under one form or another at the household level. The problem is pre-
cisely to know under what form. The research program in that area thus consists
of investigating alternative hypothesis about decision making in the household
and testing them against each other on the basis of the restrictions they may
imply for the household demand and labor supply functions. If some of these
hypotheses appear to hold against empirical evidence, it may be expected that
the corresponding restrictions on household demand behavior will permit the
identication, at least partially, of the intra-household allocation mechanism
and then the welfare of individual household members.
Various contributions have tried to introduce such alternative frameworks.
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) have proposed mod-
els based on cooperative game theory and bargaining. A more general approach
has been proposed by Chiappori (1988, 1992), Bourguignon et al. (1993),
Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2001a), who have
developed a collective framework. In its most general version, the collec-
tive approach relies on the sole assumption that household decisions are Pareto
e¢ cient; no additional requirement is made upon the choice of the particular
outcome on the Pareto frontier as in the bargaining models. The obvious advan-
tage of this approach is its generality; it is clear, for instance, that all previous
bargaining approaches are nested within the collective framework.
The question, of course, is whether this approach is not simply too general;
i.e., is it able to generate testable restrictions at all? Surprisingly enough,
several contributions have shown that, indeed, the collective model, even in
its most general version, could generate strong testable restrictions on observed
behavior. Two families of tests can be distinguished, depending on whether price
variations can be observed in the data. Tests based on price e¤ects have been
1See also Galasso (1999) for a similar investigation.
2Specically, Duo nds that the consequences of this windfall gain on child nutrition
dramatically depends on the gender of the recipient. Using the same data base, Bertrand et
al. (2000) study the impact on labor supply of younger women within the household, and nd
again that the new benets result in a much larger reduction of labor supply when they are
received by a woman.
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rst introduced by Chiappori (1992) in a very simple model of labor supply with
two egotistic agents and no public good. He shows that the Pareto e¢ ciency
assumption indeed imposes restrictions on joint labor supply functions. These
conditions have been tested by Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Blundell et al (2000)
and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002). All three papers nd that, while
Slutsky symmetry is rejected by the data, the collective conditions are not.
These tests have been later extended to a general frameworks by Browning and
Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2002a,b). The conditions these
contributions derive take the form of partial di¤erential equations that generalize
the standard Slutsky conditions of the unitary model; specically, they state
that the Slutsky matrix is the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank
at most S 1, where S is the number of members. This property has been tested,
and not rejected, on consumption data by Browning and Chiappori (1998).
Alternatively, one can consider the test problem in the absence of price
variation; then the approach must rely exclusively upon the e¤ect of income or
distribution factors. This is typically the case for the standard cross-sectional
analysis of consumption patterns, where it is assumed that individuals over the
sample face identical prices.3 In this context, a second family of tests can be
used, that generalize the income pooling family discussed above. Although
simple versions of such tests have been used in various contexts (Bourguignon
et al, 1993; Browning et al., 1994; Thomas et al., 1997), no comprehensive
theoretical analysis have been provided so far.
The rst goal of the present paper is to investigate more carefully the theo-
retical properties of the empirical procedures used in the preceding papers. We
nd that they are surprisingly general and powerful. First, a simple general
test of the Pareto e¢ ciency hypothesis is presented which is consistent with
all possible assumptions on the private or public nature of goods, all possible
consumption externalities between household members, and all types of inter-
dependent individual preferences and domestic production technology.4 More-
over, the test is proved to be necessary and su¢ cient: if it is satised, then it
is always possible to interpret observed behavior as if it was stemming from a
collective framework with well-chosen preferences. Second, a test is provided of
some separability properties in the preceding framework which are equivalent
to considering private goods and egotistic or caringagents.
A second issue is the identication problem: when and to what extent is
it possible to recover the underlying structure - preferences and the decision
process - from observed behavior? With price variations, an identication result
was rst derived in the labor supply case by Chiappori (1992), then extended by
Blundell et al (2000), Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) and Chiappori and
Ekeland (2002b). When only income and distribution factors vary, Browning
et al (1994) have shown how it was possible, using a parametric approach,
3The term cross-sectionalis slightly ambiguous in this context, since cross sectional analy-
sis of labor supply often uses (possibly instrumented) wage di¤erences between agents as price
variations. Throughout the paper, our interest is in demand analysis, and we identify cross-
sectional with the absence of price variation.
4For a related work, see Dauphin and Fortin (2001)
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to identify the intra-household allocation process under the Pareto e¢ ciency
hypothesis when the consumption by one household member of at least one good
is observed. The second purpose of the present paper is to extend these results.
Specically, we provide a complete analysis of the identication problem; we
show under which assumptions it is possible to identify, from the observation of
the household consumption of private goods, the allocation of these goods within
the household as well as the Engel curves of individual household members.
The paper is organized around the preceding sequence of results. A rst sec-
tion describes the general structure of the model used to represent consumption
decisions in a 2-person household. The following three sections are devoted to
the three basic results above.
2 The basic framework
We consider a two adult household in which the two people are denoted A and
B. We assume for the moment that there are n consumption goods and that
they all are market goods which may be consumed either privately or publicly
by the two agents. We thus denote qi 2 Rn+ the vector of private consumption
of agent i (= A;B), and by Q 2 Rn+ the vector of public consumption. The
household consumption vector of private goods (qA + qB) is denoted by q, and
that of total consumption (q +Q) by C. In line with the previous assumption,
all prices are normalized to unity so that the budget constraint is:
e0:(qA + qB +Q) = e0:C = x
where e is a vector of ones ( 2 Rn+ ), Here, x can be considered either as total
income or, as in standard cross-sectional analysis of consumption patterns, as
exogenous total household expenditure.
Each person has preferences represented by uA(qA; qB ; Q; a) and uB(qA; qB ; Q; a)
respectively, where a is a vector of characteristics that a¤ects preferences di-
rectly. We refer to the a variables as preference factors. Thus a might include
age, race, education of the two agents, number and age of children, etc.. We
refer to this preference structure as altruistic preferencesbecause the private
consumption of each member enters the preferences of the other. Note though
that this might simply reect positive or negative consumption externalities
rather than a true altruistic behavior. Also, this general formulation does not
exclude the possibility that one person does not care about the other. In sum-
mary, no restriction is placed on preferences, beyond assuming that they can be
represented by a utility function for each adult in the household.
Since individual preferences uA and uB generally di¤er we need to specify
how households make decisions about what to buy; that is, how they choose qA,
qB and Q, and thus C. We assume that the choices depend not only on total
expenditure x and preference factors a but also on a set of distribution factors
z, disjoint from a. Specically:
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Assumption A1 : There exist a set of K variables z = (z1; :::; zK) such
that:
: individual preferences are independent of z
: the overall household budget constraint does not depend on z
: the value of z does inuence the decision process.
In other words, distribution factors are variables that a¤ect the choices of
(qA; qB ; Q) but do not enter directly the utility functions or the budget con-
straint. As discussed in the introduction, several examples of distribution factors
can be found in the literature. Distribution factors will play a key role in the
following for three reasons. First, the mere fact that they can inuence be-
havior will contradict the traditional, unitary framework - as recognized by the
numerous works mentioned above. Secondly, rational models which allow for
an inuence of distribution factors upon behavior, necessarily restrict the form
taken by this inuence. This will generate tests of that extended rationality, as
it will become clear in the following. Finally, distribution factors are extremely
helpful in recovering some features of the intra-household decision process, a
point that will be emphasized in the last sections of the paper.
Notation. In the next section and a few other parts of the paper, the house-
hold demand for good i is denoted i(x; a; z) (i = 1; ::n). We use this notation
when we do not want to distinguish between public goods (then i  Xi),
aggregate consumption of a private commodity (then i = x
A
i +x
B
i ), or even in-
dividual consumption (then i = x
A
i or i = x
B
i ). In particular, the general tests
described in the next section are valid whatever the particular interpretation.
We assume all demand functions to be continuously di¤erentiable.
In considering the restrictions implied by various assumptions below we have
found it useful to use a novel type of conditionaldemand function whereby the
demand for one good is expressed as a function of the demand for another good
as well as total expenditure and preference and distribution factors. Conditional
demand functions are often used in demand analysis where we assume a single
utility function. In that framework, the demand for one set of goods (the goods
of interest) are conditioned on the price of these goods, total expenditures
on these goods and the quantities of another set of goods (the conditioning
goods); see Browning and Meghir (1991) for further discussion. Another version
of demands that are conditioned on another demand is the concept of an m-
demand introduced in Browning (2003). In this setting, one normal good is
denoted the reference good. The demand curve for the reference good is then
inverted to give total expenditure as a function of prices and the quantity of
the reference good. This is then substituted into the Marshallian demands for
other goods to give m-demands that depend on prices and the demand for the
reference good. M-demands are useful in empirical modelling when we do not
observe all quantities (and hence total expenditure is not observed) but we do
observe all prices.
In the extended rational setting considered here, we dene a somewhat dif-
ferent type of conditional demand function that turns out to be useful. Consider
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the demand for good j, Cj = j(x; a; z). Assume that j is strictly monotone in
one distribution factor at least (say, y1). Then it can be inverted on this factor:
z1 = (x; a; z 1; j)
where z 1 is the vector of distribution factors without the rst element. Now
substitute this into the demand for good i:
Ci = i(x; a; z1; z 1) = i[x; a; (x; a; z 1; j); z 1] = 
j
i (x; a; z 1; j):
Thus the demand for good i can be written as a function of total expenditure,
preference factors, all distribution factors but the rst and the demand for
good j. To distinguish this conditioning from the more conventional conditional
demands discussed above, we shall refer to them as z-conditional demands.
Note that, in the unitary setting, there are no distribution factors, so that z-
conditional demands are not dened in this case. Finally, and unless otherwise
stated, in the following we take good 1 as the conditioning good. In this case,
we drop the (upper) index in the notation of z-conditional demand:
1i (m; z; y 1; j)  i(m; z; y 1; j) for i = 2; :::n:
Various contributions apply the conditional demand approach developed here
to collective models; the reader is referred in particular to Dauphin and Fortin
(2001) and Donni (2000).
3 Testing the unitary model and Pareto e¢ -
ciency
3.1 The unitary model
In this section we investigate the restrictions imposed on the demand functions,
i(x; a; z), and their z-conditional counterparts, i(x; a; z 1; q1), by the prop-
erties that one may be willing to assume about the intra-household decision
process or its outcome. We shall essentially consider three hypotheses: the
unitarymodel; the collectiveapproach, as characterized by Pareto e¢ ciency
of the allocation of goods; and an additional, bargaining-type condition. We
begin with the unitary model, where we assume that a unique utility function
is maximized. Formally :
Denition 1 Let (qA; qB ; Q) be given, C1 functions of (x; a; z). These are com-
patible with unitary rationality if there exists a utility function U(qA; qB ; Q; a)
such that, for every (x; a; z), the vector (qA; qB ; Q) maximizes U subject to the
budget constraint.
The restrictions implied by this framework are trivial. Indeed, it assumes
that the household maximizes a single utility function, that represents the
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household preferences in some sense. A consequence is that, by denition,
the household demand functions should depend on total expenditure x and the
preference factors a, but not on the distribution factors, z. Formally :
Proposition 2 A given, C1 (direct) demand function is compatible with uni-
tary rationality if and only if it satises:
@i(x; a; z)
@zk
= 0 8i = 1; :::::; n; k = 1; :::::;K (1)
This condition is an immediate generalization of the income poolinghy-
pothesis, which has been tested, for instance, by Schultz (1990), Thomas (1990),
Bourguignon et al. (1993), Browning et al. (1994), Fortin and Lacroix (1997),
Phipps and Burton (1992), Lundberg et al (1997) and others. Interestingly
enough, it has been rejected by the data in all the above studies.
An important remark is that a model with individual utility functions and
a weighted sum of these as the household utility function is formally a unitary
model so long as the weights do not depend on distribution factors. This fact
has two consequences. First, the key insight of collective models is not that the
household does not maximize some common index, but rather that this common
index, if it exists, will in general depend directly on distribution factors (as well
as prices and incomes). It is well known, for instance, that the Nash bargaining
solution can be expressed as maximizing the product of individual surpluses.
The crucial point, however, is that each agents surplus (and therefore the index
that is maximized by the household) cannot be seen as a household utility
in the unitary sense because it involves the agents status quo point, which
typically varies with prices, income and distribution factors.
A second and more surprising implication of this result is the following.
Consider a model of collective decision making in which the household maximizes
a weighted sum of individual utilities, the weights being functions of household
income but not of distribution factors. Although this model does not belong
to the unitary class (since the index maximized by the household is income-
dependent), it is observationally equivalent to a unitary setting, in the sense that
any demand function (x; a; z) it generates could alternatively be generated by a
unitary framework. This paradoxical conclusion is due to the specic nature of
the problem, and more precisely to the absence of price variations.5 This stresses
the fact that on cross-sectional data without price variations, distribution factors
are indispensable to distinguish between the unitary and the collective setting.
3.2 The collective approach
We now consider the more general framework, in which we explicitly recognize
that the household consists of two members with potentially di¤erent prefer-
ences. Our only assumption, at this stage, is that the intra-household decision
5On the contrary, it can readily be checked that when price variations are available, the
demand stemming from a model entailing income-dependent weights will not in general satisfy
Slutsky symmetry.
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process, whatever its particular features, always leads to a Pareto e¢ cient out-
come (PE). This hypothesis characterizes what we call collective rationality.
Let us state it formally :
Denition 3 Let (qA; qB ; Q) be given, C1 functions of (x; a; z). These are com-
patible with collective rationality if there exists two utility functions uA(qA; qB ; Q; a)
and uB(qA; qB ; Q; a) such that, for every (x; a; z), the vector (qA; qB ; Q) is
Pareto-e¢ cient. That is, for any other bundle (qoA; qoB ; Qo) such that
ui(qoA; qoB ; Qo; a)  ui(qA; qB ; Q; a)
for i = A;B (with at least one strict inequality), then
e0(qoA + qoB +Qo) > e0(qA + qB +Q)
This denition is quite general since no assumption whatsoever is made upon
the form of individual preferences, the public or private nature of consumption
goods or particular features of the intra-household decision process (beyond
e¢ ciency). Yet, strong restrictions on household demand functions obtain.
Our rst crucial result is stated in the following Proposition, which provides
a necessary and su¢ cient characterization of collective demand in the cross-
sectional context:
Proposition 4 Consider a point P = (x; a; z) at which @
i
@z1
6= 0 for all i. With-
out a priori restrictions on individual preferences ui(qA; qB ; Q; a); i = A;B, a
given system of C1 demand functions is compatible with collective rationality in
some open neighbourhood of P if and only if either K = 1 or it satises any of
the following, equivalent conditions :
i) there exist real valued functions 1; :::::;n and  such that :
i(x; a; z) = i[x; a; (x; a; z)] 8i = 1; :::::; n (2)
ii) household demand functions satisfy:
@i=@zk
@i=@z1
=
@j=@zk
@j=@z1
8i = 1; ::; n; j = 1; ::; n; k = 2; ::;K (3)
iii) there exists at least one good j such that:
@ji (x; a; z 1; qj)
@zk
= 0 8i 6= j; i = 1; ::; n; k = 2; ::;K (4)
Proof. Let us rst consider the case where there are at least two distribution
factors, i.e. K > 1. From the Pareto-e¢ ciency assumption, demands should be
solutions of the following program :
max
qA;qB ;Q
uA(qA; qB ; Q; a) + : uB(qA; qB ; Q; a)
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s.t. e0:(qA + qB +Q) = x
Here, the set of PE allocations is fully described when  varies within Rn+. The
particular location of the solution on the Pareto frontier should of course be
allowed to depend on all relevant parameters: i.e.,  will in general be a function
of (x; a; z). Household demand functions can thus be written:
i(x; a; z) = i[x; a; (x; a; z)] 8i = 1; :::::; n
as stated in condition (2). Then (3) comes from the fact that:
@i=@zk
@i=@z1
=
@=@zk
@=@z1
8i; k (5)
Finally, in the neighborhood of any point where a z-conditional demand can
be dened, (2) allows us to (locally) express  as a function of qj , x and a.
Replacing in the direct demand function for good i leads to (4). Hence (2), (3)
and (4) are equivalent necessary conditions for observed demand functions to
be consistent with collective rationality.
For su¢ ciency, note that according to (2) there exists some function (x; a; z)
such that (x; a; z) can be expressed as a function (x; a; ) of x; a and  alone.
Take some arbitrary function G(1; 2; :::; n; a) that is positive, increasing and
quasi-concave with respect to the variables 1. Dene then:
M(x; a; ) = G[1(x; a; ); ::::;n(x; a; )]
We will now show that there exist two increasing and quasi-concave utility
functions vA(Q; a) and vB(Q; a) such that the observed demand functions are
solutions of (P) for (x; a; z) =M [x; a; (x; a; z)]. Clearly, these utility functions
vi(X; z) are particular cases of the general utility functions ui() appearing in
(P) because they depend only on public goods.
The necessary and su¢ cient rst order conditions implied by (P) are:
8(x; a; z) DA(; a) + :DB(; a) = :e
where Dvi is the gradient of vi and  is an arbitrary scalar function of (x; a; z).
Dene then:
B(; a) = A(1 + 2 + :::n) +B[(G(; a)]
A(; a) = C[(G(; a)]
where A, C are arbitrary increasing scalar functions and B is a scalar function
dened by:
B0(q) =  q:C 0(q)
A is taken to be large enough with respect to B so that B is increasing. These
functions A and B are thus increasing and quasi-concave. Moreover, it can
easily be checked that they satisfy (A1). It follows that the solution of (P)
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with these functions i is the set of observed demand functions (x; a; z) which
satisfy the equivalent conditions (2)-(4) in Proposition 2.
It remains to show that Proposition 2 remains valid in the case where there is
only one distribution factor, i.e. K = 1. On one hand, condition (2) is trivially
satised since it corresponds to a mere change of variable of z, whereas condi-
tions (3) and (4) become irrelevant. On the other hand, the above su¢ ciency
argument in the case K > 1 remains valid when K = 1 since it is solely based
on condition (2). This shows that in the case of a single distribution factor
and without a priori restrictions on individual preferences all observed demand
functions are consistent with collective rationality.
When all consumptions are private, condition (3) has been known to be
necessary for quite a long time.6 Proposition 4 complement existing knowledge
in three directions. First, it shows that the condition is necessary even in the
most general case (entailing public consumption, externalities, etc.); second, it
provides various equivalent versions of the conditions; third and more impor-
tantly, it shows that these conditions are also su¢ cient, in the sense that any
demand function satisfying them is compatible with collective rationality.
How should Proposition 4 be interpreted? The basic idea is that, by def-
inition, distribution factors do not inuence the Pareto set. They may a¤ect
consumption, but only through their e¤ect upon the location of the nal out-
come on the Pareto frontier - or, equivalently, upon the respective weighting of
each members utility that is implicit in this location. The key point is that this
e¤ect is one-dimensional. This explains why restrictions appear only in the case
where there are more than one distribution factors. Whatever the number of
such factors, they can only inuence consumption through a single, real-valued
function . This is what is expressed by conditions i) and ii).
This simple idea has two important consequences. First, let us compute qi
as a z1-conditional function of (x; a; qj ; z 1). Then collective rationality implies
that it should not depend on z 1. The reason is that, for given values of x and a,
whenever distribution factors (z1; z 1) contain some information that is relevant
for intra-household allocation (hence for household behavior), this information,
which is one-dimensional (as we have seen above), is fully summarized by the
value of qj . Once we condition on qj , z 1 then becomes irrelevant. This is the
meaning of condition iii).
A second, very important consequence relates to the question of the number
of distribution factors to be taken into account. At the level of generality con-
sidered here, Proposition 4 says that at least two distribution factors are needed
to test the hypothesis of collective rationality. Thus, in full generality, collec-
tive rationality imposes no restriction on household demand functions in the
case where there is only one distribution factor. Now, this does not mean that
no other restrictions can possibly be found, but rather that such restrictions
require some additional assumptions to be made upon the form of individual
preferences ui(qA; qB ; Q; a), i = A;B. In particular, we shall see below that
6See for instance Bourguignon et al, (1993); Browning et al., (1994); Thomas et al., (1997)
for the direct form and Dauphin and Fortin (2001) for the z-conditional demand version.
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further restrictions appear in the case of a single distribution factor - and come
in addition to those in Proposition 4 in the case of more than one distribu-
tion factor - when some goods are private and/or consumed exclusively by one
member of the household.
Finally, two additional remarks should be made.
Remark 1 Proposition 4 provides two distinct ways of testing for e¢ -
ciency. The rst - condition (3) - relies on testing for cross-equation restrictions
in a system of unconditional demand equations. The other method (4) tests
for exclusion restrictions in a conditional demand framework. Empirically, the
latter is likely to be more powerful for at least two reasons. First we can em-
ploy single equation methods (or even non-parametric methods). Second, single
equation exclusion tests are more robust than tests of the equality of parameters
across equations.
As an illustration, assume that the household has three sources of exogenous
income - say, wA; wB and wo, with x = wA + wB + wo. Then, while x does
enter the budget constraint, any two income sources - say, wA and wB - do
not, and can be taken as distribution factors. Hence Proposition 4 applies.
In the present case, the partial derivatives in (3) and (4) may be interpreted
as the household marginal propensity to consumea given good with respect
to the various components of household income. The unitary model would
require that these propensities be equal for all goods. Through condition (3),
collective rationality requires that these marginal propensities to consume must
be proportional across all goods, whereas condition (4) requires them to be zero,
conditionally on the demand for another good.
Remark 2 Proposition 4 generalizes easily to the Beckerian framework
where domestic goods produced by the household are taken into account. Adding
a domestic production function to go from the market inputs to the goods actu-
ally consumed by household members and taking into account the allocation of
domestic labor do not modify the above tests on household demands for market
goods.
3.3 Bargaining
Many papers that have analyzed intra-household decision processes have as-
sumed a bargaining framework. If we take an axiomatic approach and include
e¢ ciency as one of our axioms then necessarily the bargained outcome will sat-
isfy the conditions in Proposition 4. Of course, the bargaining framework should
be expected to impose additional restrictions. Although a general assessment
of the extra testable restrictions that bargaining implies is a di¢ cult and still
largely unsolved problem, an easy minimal test can be described as follows.
Assume that some distribution factors are known to be positively correlated
with member Bs (resp. As) threat point. Then, in program (P),  should
be increasing (resp. decreasing) in that distribution factor. But equation (5)
provides an easy test of this property. Formally :
12
Proposition 5 Assume that  is known to be increasing in z1 and decreasing
in z2. Then the demand functions consistent with any bargaining model are such
that:
@i=@z1
@i=@z2
=
@j=@z1
@j=@z2
 0 8i = 1; ::; n; j = 1; ::; n
Thus if we assume a priori that two distribution factors have these properties
then we have a further testable restriction. The obvious factors to take are the
incomes of the two partners. Indeed, if we are willing to go further and assume
that it is only the relative value of these incomes, z1=z2 that matters then we
have in addition:
@i
@Log(z1)
+
@i
@Log(z2)
= 0 8i = 1; ::; n
This is simple to test and easy to interpret. As an illustration, Browning et
al (1994) test the above restrictions on Canadian data, and nd they are not
rejected.
3.4 Examples
To round o¤ this section we present two parametric examples. To simplify the
exposition we shall assume that there are no preference factors a and that there
are exactly two distribution factors, z1 and z2. We rst model the unrestricted
household demands as a quadratic in (x; z):
i = ai + bix+ cix
2 + diz1 + eiz2 + fiz
2
1 + giz
2
2 + hixz1 + kixz2 + liz1z2 (6)
The restrictions implied by the unitary model are simply di = ei = ::: = li = 0.
The restrictions implied by collective rationality - conditions (3) above - are a
little more di¢ cult to determine. We can show that either one of the following
proportionality relationships must hold:
i = ai+bix+cix
2+i(d:z1+e:z2+f:z
2
1+g:z
2
2+h:x:z1+k:x:z2+ l:z1:z2) (7a)
or:
i = ai + bix+ cix
2 + i(z1 + z2) + i:(z1 + z2)
2 + !i:x:(z1 + z2) (7b)
Thus, either all the terms involving the distribution factors z1 and z2 must be
proportional across all demand functions, or all the demand functions must be
quadratic in the same linear function (z1+z2) of these factors. It is also easily
shown that the z-conditional demands consistent with (7b) have the following
expression under collective rationality:
i = i + ix+ ix
2 + iq1 + (i +  ix):
p
1 + x+ x2 + q1 (8)
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(where conditioning is made on q1). If (7a) holds we have in addition that
i =  i = 0 . Note that in the absence of theoretical restrictions, z-conditional
demands derived from the quadratic demand functions (6) would also involve
terms in z2; z22 ; x:z2 and q1:z2 both in the rst part of the RHS of (8) and under
the square root sign.
As a second example, consider the case where the household demand function
take the following extended Working-Leser form:
i = ai + bix+ cixLogx+ diLogz1 + eiLogz2 (9)
The associated z-conditional demand functions, conditioning on q1, are given
by:
i = i + ix+ ixLogx+ iLogz2 + iq1 (10)
It is then easily shown that collective rationality implies that di=ei be the same
for all i=1,..,n, or, equivalently, that i = 0 for i = 2; ::n.
4 Private goods and caring agents: testing for
collective rationality and recovering the shar-
ing rule
4.1 The sharing rule
In the previous section we did not impose any restrictions on preferences -
beyond assuming them representable by a utility function - or on the public or
private nature of the goods which are consumed. In this section we concentrate
on the allocation of private goods across the members of the household. To do
so, we impose the following restriction on individual preferences:
Assumption A2 : ui(qA; qB ; Q) =  i[A(qA; Q; a); B(qB ; Q; a); a]; i =
A;B
Here A and B have egotisticpreferences represented by the functions A
and B respectively, dened over their own consumptions of private and public
goods. Both egotistic preferences enter person is over-all utility function  i.
These functions are a particular case of altruism. Following Becker (1981) we
refer to these utility functions as caring. In comparison with the general for-
mulation in the preceding sections, we see that this hypothesis is equivalent to
some type of separability in the preferences of the two household members. Of
course, caring utility functions include the special case of egotistic preferences
for which  i

A; B

= i.
We concentrate here on private goods and we ignore the decision concerning
public goods Q. One way to proceed would be to condition everywhere on public
goods. For the sake of simplicity, we prefer to assume the following separability
property between private goods and public goods in individual preferences:
Assumption A3 : i(qi; Q; a) = f i[i(qi; a); Q; a)
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Also, from now on, x denotes total expenditure on private goods: x = e0(qA+
qB): It must be stressed that all the preceding assumptions make sense only if
it is possible to distinguish a priori public and private goods. In that case, the
consumption vectors qA and qB , on one hand, and the vector Q, on the other
are dened on disjoint sets of goods. Such a requirement was not necessary in
the preceding section.
We restrict our attention in this section to the case of a single distribution
factor z. There is no loss of generality in doing so, since we have seen in
Proposition 4 that collective rationality implies that various distribution factors
a¤ect the intra-household allocation of goods through the one-dimensional factor
. If demand functions satisfy conditions (2)-(4), the e¤ects of all distribution
factors may be summarized into those of a single one. In this case, Proposition 4
has shown that collective rationality was not imposing any restriction to demand
functions. Our objective in this section is precisely to show that this is not the
case when one restricts individual preferences through assumptions A2 and A3
to the case of private goods and caring agents. Before doing so we introduce
the fundamental notion of a sharing rule:
Proposition 6 (existence of a sharing rule) Let (qA; qB) be functions of
(x; a; z) compatible with collective rationality. Assume, in addition, that the
corresponding individual utilities satisfy Assumptions A2 and A3 above. Then
there exists a function (x; a; z) such that qi is a solution to:
max i(qi; a) subject to e0qi = xi
with i = A;B; xA = (x; a; z) and xB = x  (x; a; z).
This proposition is a particular case of the general equivalence between a
Pareto optimum and a decentralized equilibrium if there are no externalities or
public goods. It thus requires no formal proof. The function (x; a; z), which
denotes the part of total expenditure on private goods that person A receives
is the sharing rule. It describes the rule of budget sharing that the two agents
implicitly apply among themselves when choosing a particular Pareto e¢ cient
allocation. Of course, we are not assuming that households of caring agents
explicitly use such a sharing rule. Proposition 6 simply states that the outcome
of the household allocation process can be characterized in this way.
4.2 Collective rationality, private goods and caring: a rst
characterization
In the preceding section, we have shown that all demand functions (for public
or private goods) were consistent with collective rationality if there was only
one distribution factor. In this section we are restricting attention to the case of
caring and separable preferences. The natural question arises of whether there
are additional restrictions stemming from these hypotheses which would permit
us to test collective rationality, in the case where observed demands depend on
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only one distribution factor, or which would come in addition of those included
in Proposition 4 in the case of two or more distribution factors.
The answer is positive. There are additional restrictions that must be sat-
ised by joint demand functions in the case of private goods and collectively
rational caring agents. These can be expressed at di¤erent levels of generality.
At a basic level, the restriction is equivalent to taking explicitly into account
the sharing rule either in direct, or in z-conditional demands. At a higher level
of generality, we shall then see that it is in fact possible to recover the shar-
ing rule between caring agents from the observation of their joint demand for
private goods, provided these demands satisfy some restrictions. In turn these
restrictions provide a general test of the joint hypothesis of collective rationality,
private goods and caring agents.
The basic restrictions that must be satised by joint demand functions is
expressed in the following Lemma (preference factors a are dropped for conve-
nience).
Lemma 7 Assume collective rationality, A2, A3. Then :
1. Direct demands must satisfy the following : there exists a real-valued func-
tion  and 2.n real-valued functions i and i such that:
qi(z; x) = i [(z; x)] + i [x  (z; x)] for i = 1; :::n (11a)
2. z-conditional demands must satisfy the following : there exist two real-
valued functions F and G such that:
i[s+t; F (t)+G(s)] = i [t; F (t)+G(0)]+i[s; F (0)+G(s)] i[0; F (0)+G(0)]
(11b)
for all t; s in R+ and for i = 2; :::n.
In (11a), i and i are A and Bs respective demands for good i -i.e. their
Engel curves; (11a) is restrictive because it must be fullled across goods for
the same function . In (11b), t and s represent the total expenditures of A
and B respectively, that is  and (x  ), and F and G are the demands for the
conditioning good by A and B respectively. Again, the testable restriction in
(11b) is that the functions F and G must be the same across all goods but the
conditioning one. Note that this condition does not put any restriction on the
individual demands for the conditioning good. An equivalent but more direct
set of restrictions will be given in the next subsection.
Example
Although the conditions given in (11a) and (11b) may appear somewhat
involved, they are not too di¢ cult to work with for particular functional forms
for i. As an illustration, we may consider again the case of Working-Leser
demand equation (9) above:
i = ai + bix+ cixLogx+ diLogz1 + eiLogz2
i = i + ix+ ixLogx+ iLogz2 + iq1
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As we have seen, collective rationality imposes i = 0, which is equivalent to
the dis and eis being proportional across goods. Now, let us consider (11b).
We have that
i + i:(t+ s) + i:(t+ s):Log(t+ s) + i:[F (t) +G(s)]
= i + i:t+ i:t:Logt+ i[F (t) +G(0)] + i + i:s
+i:s:Logs+ i:[F (0) +G(s)]  i   i:[F (0) +G(0)]
which gives :
i:(t+ s):Log(t+ s) = i:t:Log(t) + i:s:Log(s)
This imposes that i = 0 for i > 1, so that the three sets of coe¢ cients ci; di
and ei must now be proportional. Then direct demands become :
i = ai + bi:x+ ri:; where  = x:Logx+ d:Logz1 + e:Logz2
We now consider the identication problem. In its more general version, the
problem can be stated as follows: when is it possible to recover the underlying
structure from observed behavior? Obviously, in the absence of price variations,
individual preferences cannot be recovered. The structureat stake here is the
sharing rule and individual Engel curves; that is, we ask whether it is possible,
from the observation of household aggregate demand, to identify the splitting
of private consumption between members and the demand function of each
member.
The identication problem may be approached from a parametric or a non
parametric perspective. In the parametric approach, a particular functional
form is chosen for the structural model, and a reduced form for the demand
function is derived. In particular, the derivation emphasizes the links between
the parameters of the structural model and the coe¢ cient of the demand func-
tion that will be taken to data. Identication, in this context, is equivalent to
the uniqueness of the set of parameters of the structural models corresponding
to any given specic values of the (estimated) coe¢ cients of the reduced form.
Note that uniqueness, hence identication, is conditional on the functional form;
that is, it obtains (at best) within a specic and narrow set, dened by the func-
tional form chosen at the outset. Nonparametric identication obviously implies
parametric identication for any possible functional form. Conversely, however,
it may be the case that parametric identication obtains for a particular class of
(possibly exible) functional forms, whereas nonparametric identication does
not hold. This means simply that only one structure (at most) is compati-
ble with observed behavior within the class under consideration, whereas func-
tionally di¤erent preferences and sharing rules do generate the same demand
function. It is important to note, in contrast, that our approach to the identi-
cation problem is explicitly nonparametric: we try to derive uniqueness within
the general class of (smooth) demand functions.
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4.3 The case of exclusive and assignable goods
4.3.1 A general statement
We start with two particular cases where some information is available about
individual consumption of household members; then new tests and new ways
of recovering the sharing rule may be found. While in principle rather specic,
these cases are empirically very important; most existing empirical works rely
on assumptions of this type.
We may, in some cases, observe how much of a particular good each person
consumes; this good is then said to be assignable. For instance, we may ob-
serve independently male and female clothing expenditures, or individual food
consumptions. Alternatively, some goods may be consumed by one person only.
This is the exclusivecase. One example would be information on the smoking
or drinking patterns of one household member, provided that the same commod-
ity is not consumed by the spouse - an idea reminiscent of Rothbarths adult
goodsassumption (see Deaton (1987)). Note that, in the present cross-sectional
framework, an assignable good is equivalent to a couple of exclusive goods, one
being consumed by A and the other by B.
Before considering successively these two cases, we may stress their common
feature: whenever one good is known to be exclusively consumed by one mem-
ber - say, member A - this provides some information on the sharing rule, as
described in the following Proposition:
Proposition 8 (One exclusive good) Assume collective rationality and A2, A3.
If the consumption of exactly one exclusive good (consumed by member A) is
observed, and if the demand function of member A for this good is monotone,
then we can recover the sharing rule (z; x) up to a transformation - i.e., if
(z; x) is one solution, then any solution is of the form F [(z; x)], where F is
strictly monotone- without any restriction on the observed demand function.
Proof. >From (11a), an exclusive good consumed by member A is such
that:
q(z; x) = [(z; x)]
The function  is thus some transformation of the observed demand function
q(z; x).
Note that if the implicit individual demand function  is not (globally)
monotone, then the result holds on any subset of income and distribution fac-
tors over which  is monotone. In particular, the result holds locally almost
everywhere.
The next step, of course, is to identify the transformation F . This is what is
done in the remainder of this section . Notice, however, that, except in the case
where all goods are assignable, and therefore the total (private) consumption of
both members can be observed, the sharing rule can only be identied up to an
additive constant. In all the other cases, we can only observe how the sharing
rule changes with total expenditure, x, and the distribution factor, z, but not
total individual expenditures (see Chiappori (1992) for a precise statement).
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The preceding proposition suggests that it is more convenient to use z-
conditional rather than direct demand functions wherever a good may be safely
assumed to be exclusive. Indeed, conditioning on that good is equivalent to
considering combinations of z and x such that the sharing rule is constant and
should permit to identify easily the individual Engel curves for non-exclusive or
non-assignable goods. This explains why many of the following propositions are
expressed in terms of conditional demands.
4.3.2 The case of an assignable good
We begin with the simplest case, where we observe both membersrespective
consumptions of an assignable good (or, equivalently, of an exclusive good for
member A and an exclusive good for member B). Then the following restrictions
on the two observed demand functions must hold.
Proposition 9 (One assignable good) Assume collective rationality, A2 and
A3. Assume in addition that good 1 is an exclusive good consumed by member
A, and that good 2 is an exclusive good consumed by member B. Consider an
open set on which the demand for good 2, conditional on that for good 1 is such
that: @2@x 6= 0 and @2@q 6= 0. Then the following, equivalent properties hold
true :
i) there exists a function F(t) satisfying:
2[t+ s; F (t)] = 2[s; F (0)] (1)
for all non-negative s and t
ii) there exists two functions  and g such that:
2(x; q1) = [x  g(q1)] (2a)
iii) 2 satises:
@
@x

@2=@q1
@2=@x

= 0 (3)
Proof. (1) is directly obtained from (11b) and the exclusivity condition on
good 2. (2a) expresses the fact that the demand for good 2 is that of member
B and thus depends only on the share of private expenditure going to him/her.
The function g (q1) in that expression is the share going to member A and thus
the inverse of his/her own demand function (as in proposition 9), which is in
fact the function F( ) appearing in (1). Finally, (3) is a translation of (2a) into a
partial di¤erential equation. Di¤erentiating (2a) with respect to x and q1 yields:
@2=@x = 
0 [x  g(q1)]
and
@2=@q1 =  g0(q1):0 [x  g(q1)]
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Assuming that  is non linear in x, we have that:
g0(q1) =  @2=@q1
@2=@x
(4)
This must be a function of q1 alone, which generates condition (3). Reciprocally,
(4) implies that 2( ) is a transformation of a function that is additively separable
in x and q1.
The preceding proposition provides a way of testing collective rationality,
private goods and caring in the case where the consumption of an exclusive
good is observed for each household member. The test is presented in terms of
conditional demand. Transposing it to direct demand can be made by the change
of variables (x; q1) ! (x; z) based on the observation of the direct demand
function for good 1, q1(x; z). Likewise, the sharing rule is easily recovered
through that same change of variable. The function g(q1) in the Proposition
above is the share of private expenditures going to member A. This function
is obtained, up to an additive constant, by integrating the di¤erential equation
(4) above. Then replacing q1 by its direct demand expression q1(x; z) yields the
sharing rule:
(x; z) = g[q1(x; z)]
It is also possible to use direct demand functions throughout, as shown in the
following.
Proposition 10 (Recovering the sharing rule with one assignable good).
Assume collective rationality, A2 and A3, and that q1 and q2 are consumed ex-
clusively respectively by members A and B. Assume that the direct demand for
both goods (as functions of x and z) are observed and that the corresponding
conditional demand for good 2, 2 (x; q1) fullls the conditions of proposition
10 . Then, the sharing rule is given, up to an additive constant, by the following
equivalent di¤erential equations:
i)
g0(q1) =   @2=@q1
@2=@x
(5)
(x; z) = g[q1(x; z)]
ii)
@
@x
=
@q1=@x
@q1=@z
@q1=@x
@q1=@z
  @q2=@x@q2=@z
(6)
@
@z
=
1
@q1=@x
@q1=@z
  @q2=@x@q2=@z
20
Proof. Only a proof of (ii) is needed at this stage. From (11a) for exclusive
goods we have:
q1(z; x) = [(z; x)]; q2(z; x) = [x  (z; x)]
Di¤erentiating the observed demand functions with respect to z and x yields:
@q1
@z
= 0:
@
@z
@q1
@x
= 0:
@
@x
@q2
@z
=  0:@
@z
@q2
@x
= 0:(1  @
@x
)
Solving for x and z yields (6). It may be shown that the condition under
which that resolution is possible -i.e. @q
A
@z 6= 0 @qB@z 6= 0 @q
A=@x
@qA=@z
6= @qB=@x
@qB=@z
- is
equivalent to the conditional demand 2 (x; q1) being well dened -i.e. @2=@x 6=
0 ; @2=@q 6= 0 - as in Proposition 8. It may also be shown that the integrability
condition of (6), that is the cross-derivative restriction:
@
@z
(
0@ @qA=@x@qA=@z
@qA=@x
@qA=@z
  @qB=@x
@qB=@z
1A = @
@x
0@ 1
@qA=@x
@qA=@z
  @qB=@x
@qB=@z
1A
is equivalent to condition (3) above after a change of variables.
Several remarks are in order. First, it is possible in the present case to
recover not only the sharing rule, but also the Engel curves for each individual,
up to an additive constant. Note that this identication result still holds when,
say, the preferences are identical for the two household members, or when they
are linear. With an assignable good, it is therefore possible to identify the
sharing rule, and the Engel curves, up to a constant with no restriction at all
on preferences; as we will see later, this is not possible in the general case.
Secondly, the identication of the sharing rule and individual Engel curves can
be performed using only the observed marginal propensities to consume out of
the total budget and out of the distribution factor. In other words, identication
requires to use only the rst derivatives of the observed demand functions and
does not rely upon non-linearities. This is important, since identication based
upon non linearities is generally less robust.
4.3.3 The case of one exclusive good and one private good
A less demanding assumption is that one good only is known to be exclusive.
This may be particularly adequate whenever the private nature of some con-
sumption is debatable. For instance, Browning et al. (1994) assume that female
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clothing is indeed an exclusive consumption, whereas they allow for a public
good component in male clothing. We thus consider a situation in which the
(individual) consumption of an exclusive good and the aggregate consumption
of a private non-assignable good are observed.
Restrictions implied by collective rationality turn out to be easier to express
(and to test) in terms of z-conditional demands. Specically, the demand for
good 2 conditional on good 1 are summarized in the following.
Proposition 11 (One private and one exclusive good) Assume collective ra-
tionality, A2 and A3. Assume in addition that good 1 is an exclusive good
consumed by member A, and that good 2 is a private joint consumption good.
Consider an open set on which the z-conditional demand 2(x; q1) is such that
@22=@x
2 6= 0 and @22=@x@q 6= 0: Then the following, equivalent properties
hold :
i) there exists a function F(t) satisfying:
2[t+ s; F (t)] = 2[t; F (t)] + 2[s; F (0)]  2[0; F (0)] (7)
for all positive s and t.
ii) equivalently, there exist three functions ;  and g such that:
2(x; q1) = [g(q1)] + [x  g(q1)] (8a)
iii) equivalently, 2 is such that
@
@x

@22=@x@q
@22=@x2

= 0 (9)
Proof. Proof. (i) is simply (11b). ii) is a restatement of (11a) where
g (q1) is the share of total expenditures going to member A, given that q1 is
exclusively consumed by him/her. Finally (9) is the partial di¤erential equation
expression of (8a). The equivalent of relationship (4) above is obtained now by
di¤erentiating (8a) twice:
g0(q1) =  @
22=@q1@x
@22=@x2
(10)
which leads to (9). Reciprocally (9) implies that 2x is the transformation of a
function that is additively separable in x and q1. Hence (8a).
As in the preceding case, the sharing rule may be easily recovered from the
preceding di¤erential equation in x1 and the direct demand function q1 (x; z)
through (x; z) = g[q1(x; z)]. As before, it is thus dened up to an additive
constant. Things are a little more complex in the present case when one uses
direct demand functions, although, as in the preceding case, all properties on
conditional demands have their counterpart on direct demand functions. We
leave these derivations to the interested reader.
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The basic di¤erence between the present case and that of an assignable
good is essentially that both the identication of the sharing rule and the test
for collective rationality, private goods and caring agents now rely on second
(rather than rst) derivatives of the observed demand functions. They may
thus be less robust. For the same reason identication now requires demand
functions to be non-linear.
One could also consider other cases where more than a private good, or more
than one or two exclusive goods would be observed. As in the general case, these
additional observations do not give more information on the sharing rule, but
they provide further tests of the joint hypothesis of collective rationality, private
goods (and, possibly, exclusiveness of the goods assumed to be so).
4.4 Examples.
To illustrate the preceding properties consider the case where good 1 is exclusive
and the observed demand for it is linear in x and z, and where the observed
demand for good 2 is quadratic.
q1 = a0 + a1x+ a2z
q2 = 0 + 1x+ 2x
2 + 1z + 2z
2 + xz
If only the demand for good 1 is observed then the sharing rule is of the type:
(x; z) = F (a1x+ a2z)
and identication can only be obtained through an additional arbitrary restric-
tion. If both goods 1 and 2 are observed, then it is possible to derive the
conditional demand for good 2. It is also quadratic in x and q1:
2 = A0 +A1x+A2x
2 +B1q1 +B2q1
2 + Cxq1
If good 2 is exclusive to member B then condition (3) implies that B2 = C = 0
and Proposition 2 yields:
g0(q1) =  [B1 + 2B2q1]=A1
and, after integration:
g(q1) = k   [B1q1 +B2q12]=A1
where k is some constant. The corresponding sharing rule thus is:
(x; z) = k   [B1(a1x+ a2z) +B2(a1x+ a2z)2]=A1
If good 2 corresponds to the joint consumption of both members, then Propo-
sition 2 applies. Condition (9) does not impose any restriction because the
conditional demand is quadratic on x and q1. The sharing rule is given by:
g0(q1) =  C=(2A2); (x; z) = k   [C=(2A2)](a1x+ a2z)
It is thus linear in x and z. Indeed, this is a particular case of the example
analyzed in section 4 of a linear sharing rule consistent with two private goods
and quadratic demand functions.
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4.5 Estimation and test from joint demands : the general
case
The previous results suggest that whenever information is available about indi-
vidual consumptions, then it is in general possible to recover the sharing rule
and individual Engel curves (up to an additive constant). We now show a much
more surprising result - namely that, generically on preferences, identication
obtains even without information on private consumptions.
The general argument Let us start with a single consumption good. Ac-
cording to (11a), collective rationality implies that aggregate demand by the
two household members is of the form:
qi(z; x) = i[(z; x)] + i[x  (z; x)]
This leads to the following partial derivatives:
@qi
@z
= (0i   0i)
@
@z
(11)
@qi
@x
= (0i   0i)
@
@x
+ 0i
where it is assumed that qi does indeed depend on z. Then from (11), we can
compute 0i and 
0
i :
0i =
z:qi;x + (1  x):qi;z
z
(12)
0i =
z:qi;x   x:qi;z
z
where qi;a stands for
@qi
@a .
But i (resp. i) must be a function of (z; x) (resp. x  (z; x)). Writing
that the derivative of 0i along the locus (z; x) = constant must be equal to
zero leads to the following, partial di¤erential equation in (z; x) :
1
qi;z
:[qi;xxz + qi;xz(1  2x)  qi;zz
x(1  x)
z
] (13)
=
1
z
:[xxz + xz(1  2x)  zz
x(1  x)
z
]
This is a rst information on the sharing rule (z; x). If one observes
the aggregate demand function of the household for a given good, qi(z; x), then
the sharing rule must satisfy the partial di¤erential equation (13). Equivalently
a test of collective rationality for an observed aggregate demand function qi(z; x)
is that there exists a function (z; x) such that (13) hold. However, this equation
is rather complex and does not say much on the way the sharing rule depends
on the observed demand behavior for good i.
24
More can be obtained when the aggregate demand for two goods, rather
than a single one, is observed. Without loss of generality, assume these are
goods 1 and 2. Then (13) must be satised for i = 1 and 2. Equalizing the right
hand-side of (13) for i = 1; 2 then yields:
Q12xx +Q
12
xz
1  2x
z
 Q12zz
x(1  x)
2z
= 0 (14)
with:
Qijat =
qiat
qiz
  qjat
qjz
The di¤erence with (13) and the case of only one good is that the sharing rule
must satisfy a rst order, rather than a second order, partial di¤erence equation,
which is more restrictive. Two remarks can be made:
 In general, an equation like (14) denes  up to some boundary condition
(say, to some function f (z) =  (z; :)). Again in general, the equation
(13) will be su¢ cient to pin down the function f . So one can expect that
the function will be identied from (13) and (14), although we do not
attempt to give a formal proof.
 In any case, restrictions will in general be generated on the demand func-
tions q1(z; x) and q2(z; x).
The following example substantiate this claim.
An example Though estimation of the sharing rule is always possible from
three (regular) demand functions, two of them may in some cases be su¢ -
cient. As an illustration, consider the case where the demand functions may be
assumed to be quadratic:
qi = ai + bix+ cix
2 + diz + eiz
2 + fix:z i = 1; 2
An advantage of quadratic demands is that the fundamental di¤erential equation
(13) admits linear solutions. Indeed, if x and z are constant, then the RHS
of (13) vanishes. Dene then: u =  xz and v =
1 x
z
.We have that:
2ci + fi(u+ v) + 2eiuv = 0; i = 1; 2 (15)
If the coe¢ cients e and f are not proportional across goods, we can recover u+v
and uv. Moreover, if the expression [(u+ v)2  4uv] is positive, one can recover
u and v up to a permutation; then x =
u
(u v) and z =
1
(v u) , which denes
the sharing rule as a linear function of z and x up to an additive constant.
Three commodities Going a step further now means observing the demand
functions of a household for three rather than two goods. Following the preced-
ing logical sequence, this should lead to still more restrictions on the sharing rule
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and therefore an easier identication than previously. This is actually the case,
provided that demand functions satisfy some regularity conditions. Indeed, one
can derive in that case two rst order PDE, namely (14) and
Q12xx +Q
12
xz
1  2x
z
 Q12zz
x(1  x)
2z
= 0 (16)
A result by Chiappori and Ekeland (2005) guarantees that, generically, (14)
and (16) identify  up to a constant and a permutation of members. Also, it
is clear that recovering the sharing rule, up to a constant, implies at the same
time recovering the individual Engel curves. Indeed, equations (12) give the
individual marginal propensity to consume each good i as a function of z and
x. Integrating these equations yield the individual curves up to a constant, and
of course up to a permutation of the two individuals.
It is clear, from the structure of the equations at stake, that identication
obtains up to a permutation of members: it is possible to say that one individual
in the household is getting (z; x) and has associated Engel curves 1; 2; :::;
but it is not possible to say whether that individual is A or B. In order to pin
down this last issue, in the absence of assignable or exclusive commodities, a
bargaining argument may be used. If the distribution factor is known to favor
member A, then  represents member As allocation (instead of member Bs) if
and only if  is increasing in z.
Needless to say, the determination of the sharing rule through (16) and of
the individual Engel curves through (12) is extremely complex. We have not
been able for instance to nd analytical specications of the aggregate demand
functions which would permit to derive analytically the sharing rule. The sim-
plest functional forms lead to rather intractable rst-order di¤erential equations
on . But, of course, solutions of these di¤erential equations can be worked out
numerically. The important and remarkable result here is that collective ratio-
nality implies enough restrictions on aggregate household demand functions so
as to recover the sharing rule and individual Engel curves from the observation
of aggregate marginal propensities to consume and the way they change as a
function of both total expenditures and the distribution factor.
Finally, identication is only generic, in the sense that it relies on the
non-linearities of the demand functions. Estimation and tests might then lack
robustness. More precisely, the following proposition shows that the identica-
tion of the sharing rule and the test of collective rationality is not possible in
the case of linear or quasi-lineardemand functions.
Proposition 12 (linear and quasi-linear demand systems) Assume col-
lective rationality, A2 and A3. The following two properties are equivalent :
i) Direct demands are of the form
qi = ai + bix+ ciA(z; x) (17)
ii) Conditional demands are linear :
i = i + ix+ iq1 (18)
26
Moreover, if these conditions are fullled, any function of the form f [A(y;m)],
and any function of the form f [m A(y;m)], where f is an arbitrary monotonic
transformation, is a possible sharing rule.
Proof. That (17) and (18) are equivalent is obvious. Also, for any f, dene
i and i by :
i(u) = cif
 1(u) + biu
and
i(v) = ai + biv
Then (11) is obviously fullled. Note that, in this case, the conditions of
Proposition 5 do not apply. Also, it is interesting to note that all equations (12)
are proportional, so that considering several consumption goods does not bring
additional information. As we shall see in the next section [??], the only way
to identify the sharing rule in that case is to observe an assignable good.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the properties of the collectiveapproach
to household behavior. This only relies upon one general assumption : that
decisions taken within a household are cooperative or collectively rational,
that is, lead to Pareto e¢ cient outcomes. What we have shown is that this very
general setting has considerable empirical implications. It leads in particular
to a sequence of tests which throw some light into the usual black box that
is used to analyze the household consumption decisions. Remarkably enough,
our techniques only require a distinction between those factors which may be
behind the allocation process within the household - individual earnings in the
rst place, but not only them - and those that are likely to a¤ect personal
preferences. It does not require in particular any knowledge of the actual intra-
household allocation of goods. The most general test of cooperation does not
even require any assumption on the nature of the goods that are consumed or
produced within the household.
Additional tests are available when one wants to go further and infer from
the joint spending behavior on private goods by the household some information
on who gets what. A general test is available in the case where the analysis is
restricted to private goods only. It has even been shown that it is possible, if that
test is satised, to recover from the observation of joint consumption behavior,
information on the intra-household allocation of these goods and on individual
preferences (Engel curves). More information and more restrictive tests may
be obtained in the case where at least one individual consumption is observed.
Whether those tests are robust and will actually provide more information on
intra-household decision processes will be taken up in forthcoming empirical
work.
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